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A
mAbstract
We evaluate the potential of wage subsidy programs for reducing non-employment of
the disabled by exploiting a reform of the Danish Flexjob scheme targeted towards
employing the long-term (partially) disabled. Firms received a salary reimbursement for
all employees granted a Flexjob. We examine whether a change from full to
partial reimbursement to governmental units affected the share of Flexjobs
allocated to retained (insiders) versus non-employed hirees (outsiders). After the
reform, the composition of hires changed substantially in favor of insiders, both
in absolute and relative terms. A reduction in subsidies thus leads to a decrease
in the hiring of the non-employed disabled.
JEL Codes: I38, J14, C21
Keywords: Disability; Wage subsidies; Non-employment; Difference-in-differences1 Introduction
By bringing individuals out of unemployment or other benefit receipt schemes, wage
subsidies are in theory a powerful tool for reducing the welfare loss of unemployment
(Kaldor 1936, Kessleman 1969, Phelps 1994, Calmfors 1994), i.e., the utility loss from
being out of work. By lowering unemployment, subsidies can lessen employer contri-
butions to social insurance. Yet, the empirical evidence show at best modest effects of
these programs in raising the employment prospects of the eligible unemployed
(Hamermesh 1978, Katz 1998, Card et al. 2010)1.
Few employment-contingent programs exist that are specially targeted towards the
disabled. One such program is the Ticket-to-Work in the U.S. giving SSDI beneficiaries
a ticket that can be exchanged for a job or support services from public and private
providers, employers and other organizations jointly referred to as the employment
networks (ENs). However, less than 7% of the award cohort from 1998 had enrolled in
the program by 2006 (Liu and Stapleton 2010). In the U.S. context, the reluctance of
the disabled to come out of disability is intrinsically tied to a loss of health insurance
(Medicare) (Autor and Duggan 2007). In countries with universal health insurance sys-
tems targeted schemes should be more successful in raising employment of disabled
persons2.2015 Datta Gupta et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
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as good examples of supported schemes for the disabled which are adjustable accord-
ing to a disabled person’s ability to work (OECD 2003). To date, only few formal
evaluations exist of these programs. Datta Gupta and Larsen (2010) use data from
two independent cross-section surveys from 1994 and 2001 to assess whether a
scheme for the disabled in Denmark, the Flexjob scheme, has been effective in rais-
ing the employability of the disabled and lowering their benefit receipt. They find an
effect on (the probability of ) employment but not on disability receipt. However,
measurement issues can arise when comparing the two data sets both because
disability is self-reported and because it is difficult to make consistent definitions of
eligibility.
In contrast to wage subsidy schemes for other groups (such as the unemployed), a
particular feature of subsidy schemes targeting the disabled is that both current and
new employees can be granted a subsidy. Furthermore, especially relevant for such
schemes is that the productivity of unemployed or out-of-the-labor force disabled
individuals is to a larger extent unknown to employers relative to the productivity
of their own disabled workforce. Thus, a wage subsidy scheme for raising the em-
ployability of the unemployed or out-of-work disabled may be used instead to
subsidize the wages of disabled workers within the firm. This is one of the reasons
why public subsidy schemes targeting the disabled might not in fact reduce welfare
loss.
The aim of this study is to investigate to what extent this insider/outsider substi-
tution arises in the hiring process due to wage subsidies for the disabled, a question
which the literature so far has not addressed. There are other related issues with
wage subsidies such as those employed under the scheme may have been employed
even in the absence of the subsidy, i.e., deadweight loss, and the fact that subsidized
employees may tend to displace non-subsidized employees. These questions are not
addressed within the current study. We focus only on the potential of wage subsid-
ies for the disabled for employment creation and the resulting implications for the
optimal design of such schemes and welfare-loss reduction. We bring new evidence
to the literature, which has up to now mainly evaluated employment quota schemes
for the disabled.
Our study exploits a change in the provisions of a major nation-wide scheme for
disabled workers, the Danish Flexjob scheme, and we base the analysis on compre-
hensive Danish register data. The scheme was introduced in 1998 and targeted to-
wards improving the employment prospects of the long-term (partially) disabled
who had suffered a permanent reduction in their capacity to work but still retained
some remaining work capacity. Under the scheme, firms received a salary reim-
bursement for both existing and new employees who were granted a Flexjob. Fur-
thermore, eligible workers received the wage subsidy for the duration of their
employment contract. In 2002, the reimbursement to governmental units was low-
ered while the reimbursement to private, municipal and regional employers
remained the same. Exploiting the exogenous variation arising from the change to
the reimbursement structure applying to governmental units only, we analyze
whether the differential shock in the wage reimbursement amount led to a different
hiring response among governmental units compared to the remaining part of the
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the number and the share of new Flexjobs made up of retained employees (insiders)
versus non-employed hirees (outsiders) in the group of governmental units and in
the comparison group. By retained employees, we mean those who were employed
at the same firm prior to being found eligible for the wage subsidy.
Our main finding is that lowering reimbursement changed public (state) sector
firms’ preferences from hiring new Flexjob employees from non-employment to
retaining existing employees. After the reform, which lowered the subsidy level for
state firms but left it unchanged for municipal/regional firms, state firms reduced
the total number of new Flexjobs created as theory would predict. Furthermore,
public sector firms were – both in absolute and relative terms – less inclined to hire
disabled workers from non-employment and much more inclined to take in Flexjob
hires from within. Thus, our results show that when subsidies are lowered in a
regime where worker productivity is not known with certainty, as is the case for
disabled workers, increased internal hiring can result. Put differently, when the
salary reimbursement to firms is decreased, there is less scope for welfare-loss
reduction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the literature on
wage subsidies, section 3 describes the Flexjob scheme and the reimbursement reform,
section 4 outlines the empirical strategy and related issues, section 5 describes the
method, section 6 presents the data and descriptives, section 7 analyzes the results of
the estimations, section 8 discusses implications of the findings and, finally, section 9
offers a brief conclusion.
2 The wage subsidy literature
The wage subsidy literature has found modest employment effects for disadvantaged
groups as well as small substitution effects – unsubsidized workers being replaced
by subsidized workers (Bell et al. 1999, Blundell et al. 2004, Kangasharju and Vene-
toklis 2007. Girma et al. 2008, Rotger and Arent 2011, Betcherman et al. 2010).
However, hardly any studies have investigated the potential of wage subsidies tar-
geted towards the disabled as a means for increasing the employment of this group.
One study estimating fixed effects difference-in-difference models exploiting the
introduction of a wage subsidy scheme in Finland in 2006 for older workers (54+)
found little effects of the scheme for the targeted group, arguing that demand for
older workers may be quite inelastic and hence unresponsive to financial incentives
(Huttunen et al. 2013).
We know of only a few studies directly addressing the issue of subsidies/employ-
ment quotas for disabled workers. A paper by Humer et al. (2007) examines the im-
pact of the Austrian Employment Act for the Disabled that grants extended
employment protection, requires a hiring quota for firms, and subsidizes the
employment of severely disabled (SD) workers. Estimating fixed effects regressions
on disabled workers, they show that workers holding a job when acquiring legal SD-
status have substantially better subsequent employment prospects after an SD-
award than before, while the opposite is the case for those who do not hold a job at
the date of SD-entry. These findings suggest that employment protection legislation
places substantial firing costs on firms and has a major impact on the decisions of
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time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity captured via fixed effects. However, the SD
award combines subsidies with other types of incentives to firms so it is difficult to
conclude which part of the policy promotes employment of the disabled.
Focusing only on the employment quota aspect of the Austrian Employment Act for
the Disabled whereby firms are required to provide at least 1 job to a disabled worker
for every 25 jobs to non-disabled workers or otherwise face a non-compliance tax,
Lalive et al. (2013) utilize the sharp discontinuity at 25 non-disabled workers and find that
firms exactly at the threshold employ 20% more disabled workers than firms below the
threshold. The main results are found by considering the first threshold only, firm size
above or below 25, but this is the most relevant threshold capturing the majority of
firms in the Austrian labor market. Furthermore, their results apply to private sector firms
only. They disaggregate the treatment effect and find that 50% of it is due to
firms retaining their own former employees, 42% arises due to firms employing dis-
abled workers from other firms and 8% due to firms hiring disabled workers out of
employment.
While many countries have adopted employment quotas of the above type for in-
creasing the employment of the disabled, quotas are typically only filled in 50-75% of
cases, fines are not always imposed, and furthermore, a quota may result in a cap on
disabled employment if firms satisfy the required hiring and no more (Mont 2004).
This should not be the case for wage subsidy schemes for the disabled since there is no
fixed upper limit to hiring; however, whether subsidies lead to greater job creation for
the disabled than quotas would depend, in part, on the size of the subsidy relative to
the expected value of the fines.
Still, we have not found many studies that can analyze the potential for wage subsid-
ies to increase employment of the disabled.
A recent paper by Baert (2014) reports on the result of a large-scale field ex-
periment in Belgium which sent identical, fictitious applications originating from
young male graduates with or without a disability to 768 vacancies in the Flemish
labor market. The applications with a disability alternated between mentioning an
entitlement to a wage subsidy program, which covered between 20-40% of the
total wage cost, or not. The call-back rates showed that the applications from
disabled individuals had a substantially lower call-back rate (47%) but no signifi-
cant differences between those who mentioned the wage subsidy program and
those who did not. Thus, the subsidy program did not have the intended effect at
least where employment of young disabled individuals is concerned. This finding
need not necessarily apply to all disabled workers since firms may need to be
given larger incentives to hire young disabled workers who have a longer ex-
pected career horizon.
There is clearly a need within this sparse literature for more evidence from different
settings on the welfare economic consequences of wage subsidy schemes designed to
raise the employability of disabled individuals, as well as a need to evaluate the Danish
Flexjob scheme, which is a large-scale wage subsidy scheme for disabled workers. By
exploiting variation arising from the reform of the reimbursement structure, we provide
quasi-experimental causal evidence of its effect on the hiring response of affected firms
compared to unaffected firms. Within our set-up, we are able to address the issue of
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employed disabled individuals or whether they are used by firms to hire their own
former employees. The assumption being made here is that hiring from outside does
more to reduce welfare loss of non-work than hiring from within, i.e., former em-
ployees. This assertion is likely to hold because the non-employed disabled have a
lower probability of finding employment compared to the group of former employees
of the firm; thus, as a group they suffer a greater utility loss of being out of work. While
we control for the degree of unemployment in the year the individual has been look-
ing for work, Kroft et al. (2013) show that individual labor market history also
matters, i.e., the longer an individual has been out of work, the more difficult it is to
find a new job.
If, on the other hand, tastes for work are lower for the non-employed, then the utility
loss of former employees of being out of work could be higher. Since we control for
various measures of health and health care usage in the analysis, differences in tastes
for work cannot arise due to differences in, e.g., the severity of the disability across the
two groups. We maintain therefore that welfare-loss reduction is greater if the disabled
non-employed are hired via the wage subsidy scheme.
In the next section, we describe the design of the Flexjob scheme and the reimburse-
ment reform.
3 The flexjob scheme
On January 1st 1998, the Danish government put into force a law introduced by the
Ministry of Social Affairs creating permanent wage-subsidized jobs for the long-term
disabled known as the Flexjob scheme (National Labor Market Authority 2010).
Under the Flexjob scheme, jobs are both subsidized and associated with special
working conditions, e.g., reduced working hours and/or the absence of physically
demanding or stressful tasks. To be eligible for a subsidized job, the individual
must have suffered a considerable and permanent reduction in working capacity
and must have exhausted all other avenues of obtaining unsubsidized employment
as determined by the competent local government authorities3. Employers who
hire eligible workers are entitled to a partial wage subsidy – graduated according
to the degree of reduction of working capacity – corresponding to either 1/3, 1/2
or 2/3 of the wage4,5. Unlike many other wage subsidy programs, the subsidy is
unlimited in duration existing as long as the worker retains the job6. Few
Flexjob-grantees actually leave the scheme. The majority of those leaving the
scheme retire permanently through, e.g., disability or old age pension (National
Labor Market Authority 2010).
In terms of the costs of the program, Denmark is among the few OECD countries
spending more than 10% of their disability spending on active labor market programs
(OECD 2010). In 2010, government expenditures on the wage subsidies amounted to
DKK 9.5 billion (0.54% of GDP). In total, the government spent DKK 33 billion (1.77%
of GDP) on all active labor market programs (ALMPs) in 2012 (Ministry of Finance
2012, Statistics Denmark 2012, Ministry of Employment 2012). Thus over a quarter of
the ALM expenditures were on wage subsidies. In 2012, almost 85,000 individuals were
found eligible for a Flexjob and underwent formal visitation, far exceeding the initially
estimated 23,000 visitations in 2004. The Flexjob program has until recently been in its
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disabled persons annually. Job creation, however, has not been able to keep up with this
flow, with only 381 Flexjobs created in net in 2012 compared to 2011, so currently wait
unemployment7 is almost 30%.
3.1 The reimbursement reform
One year after the introduction of the Flexjob scheme, on January 1st 1999, a
circular letter came into force, granting government institutions reimbursement
of all wage expenses paid to individuals granted a Flexjob. Other firms (private,
municipal and regional sectors) were still subject to a subsidy of 1/3, 1/2 or 2/3
of the wage depending on the assessed reduction in the employee’s working
capacity (limited to 1/2 and 2/3 after July 2002). In May 2002, this additional
reimbursement to government entities was reduced to cover only half of the
amount not reimbursed by the normal Flexjob scheme for those granted a Flex-
job after April 1st 2002.
Before the reform in 2002, the wage subsidy, ws, paid to governmental units was
equal to the market wage wm (100% subsidy), ws,= wm. To other firms, ws was a
function of the percentage loss of working capacity, WC Loss,
ws ¼ 0:33wm; if 0:32 < WC Loss < 0:50
¼ 0:50wm; if 0:49 < WC Loss < 0:67
¼ 0:67wm; if WC Loss > 0:66
After the reform in May 2002, the subsidy to governmental units was¼ 0:67wm; if 0:32 < WC Loss < 0:50
¼ 0:75wm; if 0:49 < WC Loss < 0:67
¼ 0:83wm; if WC Loss > 0:66;
while to other firms, it remained as before (0.33 wm, 0.5 wm and 0.67 wm respectively).After July 2002, both groups of firms lost subsidization at the lowest level of working cap-
acity loss, i.e., 0.32 <WC Loss < 0.508.
Theory predicts that when wages are subsidized, employment should increase. A
simple illustration of the partial equilibrium effects of an employer-side subsidy for
disabled workers can be shown as in Katz (1998) by an outward shift of the demand for
labor curve, holding constant a perfectly elastic or upward sloping supply curve.
According to the Danish wage bargaining model, public sector wage determination is
negotiated between employer and employee representatives in the collective bargaining
rounds. Thus, we expect that wages do not adjust much, and the greatest adjustment
will take place with respect to hiring (firms are wage-takers). Furthermore, it is prob-
ably the case that the productivity of many of disabled is lower than the wage floor
agreed at the sectorial level between social partners. In that case, also, employment is
set by labor demand. Even if the supply of disabled labor is not perfectly elastic, an
increase in the subsidy means that the demand curve for labor shifts out, and employ-
ment increases.
Assume that the available pool of hires for Flexjob positions is made up of former
employees who have acquired a disability and of the disabled who are recruited from
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employed, i.e., unemployed or individuals out of the labor force. Without being
able to observe the productivity of the disabled accurately, the employer expects
that former employees are more productive than individuals applying from outside
the firm and fills up positions using the former group first. Now, if the subsidy is
reduced, the firm will hire fewer workers in all but will still hire (those expected
to be) the most productive first, meaning that the composition of hired disabled
workers will change: Fewer will be hired externally, while more will be hired intern-
ally. In particular, the hiring of the non-employed will decrease because the productivity
of this group is even more unknown than the productivity of employees from other
firms9.
We are able to test this prediction by combining a reform that exogenously changed
the subsidy rate for disabled workers with unique information on whether a new Flex-
job hire was previously employed in a regular job at the same firm or originated from
outside the firm. Controlling for health and other worker background characteristics,
we can treat the latter as a proxy measure for the potential of wage subsidy programs
to reduce welfare loss, i.e., by promoting hiring from outside the firm. In the next sec-
tion, we describe our empirical strategy.
4 Empirical strategy
In order to properly evaluate the total labor market effect of the Flexjob scheme, for ex-
ample, in terms of lower unemployment, it would require random implementation of
Flexjobs to people in different areas, sectors or to people with given measurable
characteristics.
Unfortunately (from a researcher’s point of view), the Flexjob scheme was imple-
mented universally with no measurable limitations to entry regarding age, education,
geographical area, sector or the like. In order to be granted a Flexjob, an individual as-
sessment is made based on medical examination and caseworker evaluation of the ap-
plicant’s degree of reduced working capacity.
In the absence of relevant comparison groups, an applicable econometric strat-
egy would be to compare Flexjob employees to a matched group of (theoretically)
identical non-Flexjob employees. This strategy would require some degree of
equality between people granted a Flexjob and people not granted a Flexjob, and
for this strategy to be successful, we would have to assume some inefficiency in
the authorities’ assessment procedure and/or assume that some individuals eli-
gible for Flexjob do not apply (which would also imply irrationality). Hence, we
reject this strategy.
Instead, we limit our scope to individuals who have been granted a Flexjob and who
are publicly employed in either the municipal/regional or the federal governmental sec-
tor. These sectors have been subject to different and changing reimbursement rules
constituting natural experiments that can be used to evaluate the effect of the Flexjob
wage subsidy scheme. We leave out private sector employees because this sector is af-
fected by the business cycle to a much larger extent than the two public sectors. That
is, we assume that the behavior of the municipal/regional sector is more similar to that
of government institutions even though these sectors perform different public tasks.
While the municipal/regional sector is responsible for decentralized tasks that vary
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childcare and eldercare, and elementary school, federal governmental institutions are in
charge of centralized tasks such as the judicial system, the police and the defence and
institutions that take care of, e.g., tax collection, youth education and national environ-
mental issues. Still, we expect and show that employment and other variables develop
similarly over time in these two sectors.
Since only few Flexjobs were granted the first year, 1998, we are not able to exploit
the initial 1999 reform giving state firms 100% reimbursement. Instead, we exploit the
exogenous variation from a reform of the scheme conducted in May 2002 of the reim-
bursement rules applicable to government institutions.
Because we analyze sectorial differences, the individuals of interest are neces-
sarily employed, which obviously does not allow us to be concerned with employ-
ment probabilities. Instead, we supply descriptive information on the number of
newly hired employees10 and empirical evidence on the development of the
composition of Flexjob hires over time as indirectly providing evidence of the
welfare loss reducing effect of the scheme in terms of drawing non-employed
disabled individuals into the labor market. Our outcome variables, which we use
to examine the reduction of the welfare loss of non-employment, are, relative to
all new Flexjob hirees, 1) whether the new Flexjob employee is hired from non-
employment (outsider) and 2) whether the new Flexjob employee is a retained
employee (insider). In between these two groups is the (relatively small) group of
new Flexjob employees hired from employment in other firms, which we do not
examine in detail.
Based on this empirical setup, however, we are not able to completely quantify the
general (labor market) equilibrium effects of the Flexjob scheme, such as any potential
displacement of non-subsidized workers. Furthermore, if governmental units compete
with private sector firms, and if they have a cost advantage with the subsidy, this could
reduce employment among less-subsidized firms. If such general equilibrium effects
exist, then a decrease in the subsidy rate for governmental units leaving unchanged the
subsidy rate of other firms should reduce the number of employees within these units
compared to in the other firms. Within the scope of this paper, we are not able to ana-
lyse local markets where the presence of governmental units varies to test for such
effects.
5 The model
We exploit exogenous variation arising from the change in reimbursement rules applic-
able to government institutions from May 2002. The focus is on the average treatment
effect of the reform on the composition of Flexjob employees in the period between
1999 and 2005. The treatment group consists of employees in the governmental sector,
while the comparison group consists of employees in the municipal and regional
sector.
We apply a difference-in-differences framework in which we compare differ-
ences in the composition of individuals being granted a Flexjob before and after
the reform. Specifically, we compare, first, the share of new Flexjobs employees
hired from non-employment and, second, the share of new Flexjob employees
who are retained employees between the treatment and comparison groups before
Datta Gupta et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:10 Page 9 of 26and after the reimbursement reform. The firms that employ individuals in Flex-
jobs in the governmental sector before the reform receive a more generous sub-
sidy than they do after.
The legitimacy of the difference-in-differences approach is grounded on three as-
sumptions: 1) The change in the reimbursement rules provided exogenous variation; 2)
there were no sector specific shocks coincident with the 2002 change in the reimburse-
ment rules, and 3) secular trends in the labor market are common to individuals in
both groups. As for the first assumption, the circular letter changing the reimburse-
ment rules was published by the Danish Ministry of Finance on May 28th, 2002 – after
this date, the rules took effect and applied to all Flexjobs even those that had started
earlier, from April 1st, 2002. Hence, any bias arising from anticipation of the reform is
unlikely.
The second assumption, that there were no sector specific shocks co-incident
with the 2002 reimbursement reform might not be fulfilled. On December 14th,
2001 the government imposed a hiring freeze in the governmental sector which
lasted about a month until January 24th, 2002. The hiring freeze did not affect
the employment of Flexjob employees. However, subsequent cuts in this sector
might have affected Flexjob employment in 2002. Looking at the development in
the total number of Flexjobs created in 2002 compared to 2001, we do not see a
visible dip, see Figure 1. Still, to avoid any potential co-incidence of the 2001/
2002 hiring freeze with the reform effect, we omit information for 2002 in our
empirical analysis11. Another nearly co-incident reform of the Flexjob scheme is
the before-mentioned abandonment of the 1/3 wage subsidy in July 2002. This
reform did not affect reimbursement, but instead it strengthened the Flexjob
eligibility criterion. A working capacity reduction of at least 50% (based on indi-
vidual assessment made jointly by medical examiners and municipality case-
workers) was now required to be awarded a Flexjob. This reform was universal
and not sector-dependent. Further, the share of Flexjob-grantees which were
entitled to this subsidy before the reform seems to be negligible. Hence, we do
not expect it to coincide with our findings (see in addition endnote 8).
The third assumption is that secular trends in the labor market are common to indi-
viduals in the treatment and the comparison group respectively. By exploiting the lon-
gitudinal structure of the available data, we can justify the assumption by first looking
at pre-market trends for a number of labor market and health measures in 1997–2001
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Figure 2 Employees recruited from non-employment relative to all employees by sector,
percent, 1997–2001.
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ond, we compare employees in the different sectors for each of our outcome measures
in the pre-reform period from 1999 to 2001, that is, the share recruited from non-
employment relative to all new Flexjob employees (Figure 7a) and the share of retained
Flexjob employees relative to all new Flexjob employees (Figure 7b) in the governmen-
tal, the municipal/regional and the private sector, respectively, in the pre- and post-
periods. These figures show plausibly similar trends among individuals employed in the
two public sectors before the reform, which is supported by the placebo test conducted
year-by-year in the analysis period, see below. The private sector, however, does not
share the same pre-trend, which is why we do not include it in comparison group.
5.1 DD treatment equation – retained flexjob employees
We estimate the following difference-in-differences equations on a sample of newly
granted Flexjob holders where the outcome is (1) the likelihood of being a Flexjob em-
ployee hired from non-employment and (2) the likelihood of being a retained Flexjob
hire for the years 1999–2005 (excluding 2002):
FJNONit ¼ αN þ βN1 POSTt þ βN2 GOVTit þ τNPOSTt  GOVTit þ θNXit þ εit ð1Þ
FJRETit ¼ αR þ βR1POSTt þ βR2GOVTit þ τRPOSTt  GOVTit þ θRXit þ νit ð2Þ
where FJ_NON = 1 if the new Flexjob employee i in year t was either unemployed or
out of the labor market in t-1, and FJ_RET =1 if the new Flexjob employee i in year t
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Figure 4 Number of doctor visits among all employees by sector, average, 1997–2001.
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market but from a different firm). FJ_NON (FJ_RET) = 0 if i is granted a new Flexjob
but was not unemployed or out of the labor market (working in that firm) in year
t-1, GOVT is an indicator for belonging to the treatment group for individual i in
year t, i.e., a government sector employee, POST indicates 2003 and later, X is a set
of characteristics controlling for compositional changes in treatment and comparison
groups over time, and τ is the parameter of interest, i.e., the treatment effect, which is
the relative difference in the effect of being a government sector employee between the
pre- and post-reform periods. As outcomes are measured as 0/1 variables, both linear
probability and probit models are estimated. In principle, individuals could be observed
multiple times in the data if they fulfill the conditions of not being observed either in a
Flexjob from out of non-employment or working in the Flexjob-granting firm the year
before the observation period. In our data, however, no individual is observed more than
once, corresponding to the observation that very few Flexjob-grantees actually leave the
scheme, see Section 3. In principle, we could estimate the ratio of (1) and (2) only since
the balance group is relatively small, but that would not give information on whether the
numerator or the denominator or both changed.6 Data
We obtain our data from a Danish longitudinal register dataset created for administra-
tive purposes. The dataset contains the entire Danish population of immigrants and
their descendants as well as a representative 10% sample of native Danes. In the estima-
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Figure 6 Employees that receive disability benefits the following year, by sector, percent 1997–2001.
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to 2006.
In the analyses, we restrict our dataset to the period 1999 to 2005 but omit infor-
mation for 2002, see also Section 5. A major reform of the Flexjob scheme was in-
troduced in 2006, and therefore the period of analysis is restricted to end at 2005.
Furthermore, we do not include information for 1998 because the circular letter



























Figure 7 a. FJ recruited from non-employment relative to all new FJ employees by sector,
1999–2001 and 2003–2005. b. Retained FJ relative to all new FJ employees by sector,
1999–2001 and 2003–2005.
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data into two groups: The treatment group consisting of individuals employed in
the governmental sector, and the comparison group consisting of individuals
employed in the municipal/regional sector.
In Figure 1, we show descriptive evidence on the number of new Flexjob hires in the
comparison and treatment group both before and after the reimbursement reform. In
the pre-reform years, the two groups face a similar increase. After the reform, however,
the number of new Flexjob hires is lower in the treatment group compared to the
pre-reform period (2003–2005 vs. 1999–2001), while it is higher in the comparison
group12. This descriptive evidence suggests that lowering reimbursement to govern-
mental units reduced their incentives to hire Flexjob workers as intended (and as
theory would predict).
In terms of the effect of the reform on the composition of Flexjob hires, Figure 8
shows descriptive evidence that while the composition remains the same in the munici-
pal/regional and private sectors, the share of non-employed employees (outsiders) falls
and the share of retained employees (insiders) increases in the government sector after
the reform. Note that Figure 8 shows that in the Danish context, a much higher share
of subsidized workers come from non-employment and a much lower share from
other firms compared to the Austrian private sector evidence in Lalive et al. (2013),
presumably because of a greater pressure from the government for firms to hire out of
non-employment.
Finally, Figure 9 shows descriptive evidence that even though the total number
of Flexjob hires decreases from the before (1999–2001) to the after (2003–2005)
period, the number of retained Flexjob hires actually increases, while the number
of Flexjob employees hired from non-employment significantly decreases. By con-
trast, an increase in the total number of Flexjob hires in the municipal/regional
and private sectors can be seen both among retained Flexjob hires and Flexjob em-
ployees hired from non-employment. In other words, according to this descriptive
evidence, the compositional change in the treatment group from outsiders to in-
siders appears both in relative and absolute terms. We turn next to econometric
analysis of the effect of the reform on the composition of Flexjob hires.6.1 Sample and variables
Our sample consists of all new Flexjob hires in each of the years 1999–2001 and
2003–2005. For outcomes, we employ binary indicators of whether the newly hired
Flexjob employee comes from a) non-employment or not, or b) is a retained em-
ployee or not, i.e., employed in the same firm before being granted a Flexjob,
respectively.
As control variables in our difference-in-differences analysis, we include age,
gender, an indicator variable showing whether the individual is a non-native
Dane, educational level, the degree of unemployment the year before the Flexjob
was granted, the annual number of days on sickness benefits, the annual num-
ber of doctor visits and share with a hospital diagnosis of any type of musculo-
skeletal disease, which is the most prevalent diagnosis among Flexjob employees.
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Figure 8 Composition in relative terms of new FJ employees separately by sector, 1999–2001 and 2003–2005.
a) Government b) Municipality/region c) Private.
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showing the fraction of the year the individual has been looking for work but
unable to find one. We also scale the annual number of days on sickness bene-
fits by a factor of 100.
6.2 Descriptive statistics
In terms of the control variables, summary statistics are shown in Table 1. It appears
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Figure 9 Composition in absolute terms of new FJ employees separately by sector before and after reform.
a) Government b) Municipality/region c) Private.
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cational level, degree of unemployment, sickness benefits, annual doctor visits, and
share with a hospital diagnosis of any type of musculoskeletal disease. Recall that de-
gree of unemployment ranges from 0–100 and shows the fraction of the year the indi-
vidual has been looking for work but unable to find one. The non-Danish share varies
slightly across periods and across groups but within a fairly narrow range, 0.04-0.05.
New Flexjob grantees in treated and comparison firms tend for the most part to have a
similar development over time in most characteristics between ‘pre’ and ‘post’ periods.
The only notable difference is in the share of males. Treated firms have a significantly
higher share of male Flexjob hirees than comparison firms (municipal and regional sec-
tor) in the post period. Therefore, it is necessary to control for this variable in the ana-
lysis. Below, we test for composition changes between pre-reform and post-reform
periods using each of the explanatory variables one by one as the dependent variable.
Table 1 Summary statistics for all new Flexjob hires, treatment and comparison group,
pre- and post- reform
Treatment group Comparison group
Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
Share Flexjob recruited from non-employment
(relative to all new Flexjob hires)
0.422b 0.134a 0.238 0.260
Share retained Flexjob hires (relative to all new
Flexjob hires)
0.384b 0.738a 0.583 0.561
Non-native Dane 0.053 0.044 0.045 0.045
Age 45.19 47.76 46.15 48.65
(0.740) (0.934) (0.398) (0.329)
Male 0.415 0.470a 0.337 0.229
Vocational training 0.334 0.367 0.336 0.361
Higher education 0.252 0.359 0.196 0.347
Degree of unemployment, year t-1 (*100) 6497 2732 5791 2694
(1470) (1133) (728) (382)
Annual number of days with sick benefits (*100) 5667 7493 5485 8067
(761) (926) (380) (359)
Annual number of doctor visits 9.989 12.79 10.32 12.09
(1.62) (1.11) (0.424) (0.362)
Diagnosed with diseases in bones, muscles and
connective tissue
0.099 0.166 0.094 0.132
Number of observations (minimum)c) 185 146 664 927
Notes: a)Significant difference between treatment and comparison group in the post-reform period, p < 0.1.
b)Significant difference between treatment and comparison group in the pre-reform period, p < 0.1.
c)For the variable “Share retained Flexjob hires (relative to all new Flexjob hires)”, we have a total of 1,922 observations.
For the remaining variables, we have a total of 1,926 observations.
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7.1 Main results
The effect on the proportion of new Flexjob employees hired from a) non-employment
and b) retained employees before and after the reform appears in Table 2 and 3. For
the first outcome, in the comparison group, the proportion of previously non-employed
Flexjob employees is at the same level before and after, namely 24–26 percent. In the
treatment group, the proportion before the reform is 42% and 13% after the reform.Table 2 Reform effect on Flexjob recruitment from non-employment
LPM Probit (marginal effects)
Without covariates With covariates Without covariates With covariates
Post 0.022 0.102*** 0.022 0.087***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028)
Governmental sector 0.184*** 0.187*** 0.179*** 0.180***
0.047 (0.046) (0.046) (0.044)
Post* governmental sector −0.310*** −0.321*** −0.219*** −0.219***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.027) (0.026)
R2 0.020 0.133
Number of observations 1,922 1,922 1,922 1,922
Inference: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
LPM and Probit analyses. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Governmental sector compared to municipal/regional sector, difference-in-differences.
Table 3 Reform effect on Retained Flexjob
LPM Probit (marginal effects)
Without covariates With covariates Without covariates With covariates
Post −0.022 −0.092*** −0.022 −0.099***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Governmental sector −0.199*** −0.198*** −0.194*** −0.192***
0.048 (0.047) (0.046) (0.044)
Post* governmental sector 0.376*** 0.389*** 0.319*** 0.324***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.042) (0.040)
R2 0.022 0.097
Number of observations 1,926 1,926 1,926 1,926
Inference: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.
LPM and Probit analyses. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Governmental sector compared to municipal/regional sector, Difference-in-differences.
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points, which is highly significant, see Table 2.
Along the same lines, in terms of the second outcome, the proportion of previously
retained Flexjob employees is at the same level in the comparison group before and after,
namely 56–58 percent, while in the treatment group, the proportion before the reform is
38% and 74% after the reform. This implies a total difference in the before and after differ-
ences of 38 percentage points, which also is highly significant, see Table 3.
These results show that lowering the reimbursement decreases the proportion of em-
ployees hired from non-employment (outsiders) and increases the proportion of retained
employees (insiders) among the newly granted Flexjob employees. Also after adding
covariates, this effect of the reform remains significant, and the difference-in-differences
coefficient remains at −32 and 39 percentage points respectively13. The impact is very
large relative to the proportion of non-employed and, especially, retained Flexjob em-
ployees before the reform, namely, 42% and 38%, see Table 1. That is, our results show
that in the governmental sector, the proportion of non-employed Flexjob employees is
only about 3/4ths as large and the proportion of retained Flexjob employees, about twice
as large as it would have been in absence of the reform. Similar results are obtained in the
probit specifications. As the coefficients are rather substantial, we first subject the esti-
mates to a series of robustness checks. Next, we test for compositional changes between
pre-reform and post-reform periods and search for heterogeneity in the reform effect.7.2 Robustness checks
First, as a placebo test, we examine the impact of the reform year-by-year for each of
these outcome measures, see Figures 10a and b. Second, we present a number of other
robustness checks in Tables 4 and 5.
The year-by-year impact of the reform on the proportion of non-employed (retained)
Flexjob employees is significantly negative (positive) in each of the years from 2003 and
on (see Figures 10a and b). The impact decreases (increases) from 2003 to 2004 and after
that, it seems to level out. As expected, we find no significant effect in the before period.
In Tables 4 and 5, we first test for the presence of any anticipation effects by omitting Flexjob
employees employed in the period January 1st, 2001 to December 31st, 2001 from the ana-





























Figure 10 a. Reform effect on FJ recruitment from non-employment year-by-year. Governmental sector
compared to municipal/regional sector. b. Reform effect on retained FJ year-by-year. Governmental sector
compared to municipal/regional sector. Note: LPM estimates. Difference-in-differences model. The solid line
indicates the effect, and the dashed lines represent a 95% confidence interval using robust standard errors.
The model controls for age, gender, education, lagged degree of unemployment, annual number of sick
days, annual number of visits to a doctor and diagnosed with disease in bones, muscles and connective
tissue. The period before the reform (2001) is set equal to zero.
Table 4 Main results and robustness checks on reform effect on Flexjob recruitment
from non-employment
Flexjob recruitment from non-employment
Without covariates With covariates




Anticipation effect: Year 2001 excluded −0.334*** −0.348***
(0.075) (0.072)
[1,547] [1,547]
Sickness benefits omitted - −0.315***
(0.057)
[1,922]
Inference: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
LPM/OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in brackets.
Difference-in-differences analyses.
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Table 5 Main results and robustness checks on reform effect on retained Flexjob
employees
Retained Flexjob employees
Without covariates With covariates




Anticipation effect: Year 2001 excluded 0.416*** 0.426***
(0.079) (0.078)
[1,551] [1,551]
Sickness benefits omitted - 0.387***
(0.065)
[1,926]
Retained Flexjob employees equal to 1 only if
new Flexjob employees’ unemployment rate




Inference: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
LPM/OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in brackets.
Difference-in-differences analyses.
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cially in the public sector, in the next rows of Tables 4 and 5, we check whether the removal
of sickness benefits as a control variable changes a estimated treatment effect. It does not.
We carry out an extra robustness test in Table 5 where we change the definition
of our outcome to only include those individuals who have not experienced any
unemployment in the year of observation. Some retained Flexjob hires may have
been employed in the firm, became disabled and subsequently experienced a spell
of unemployment as a result of their sickness/disability and then re-joined the
same firm. Redefining these individuals as non-retained does not change the
results.
7.3 Compositional changes and heterogeneous treatment effects
To examine whether our treatment group and comparison group are comparable, we
present the findings of tests of potential compositional changes between pre-reform
and post-reform separately for our sample in Table 6. The dependent variables are each
of our explanatory variables, included one by one. For only one variable, gender, does
the composition of the sample change from the pre- to the post-reform period. This re-
flects that the share of men among the Flexjob hires increases for the treatment group
in this period, while it decreases for the comparison group. Since gender does not affect
our main estimates significantly, see Additional file 1: Table S1 and Table S2, it seems
reasonable to believe that this compositional change does not affect our main results.
Below, we examine whether our results apply to men and women separately. For the
remaining variables, there are no significant compositional changes in our sample be-
fore and after the reform.
In Tables 7 and 8, we search for heterogeneity in the reform effect on our outcomes
(conditional on being a new Flexjob hire) with and without covariates. In general, we
Table 6 Test for compositional changes between pre-reform and post-reform periods, all
new Flexjob hires
All new Flexjob hires
Without covariates With covariates
Dependent variable









Vocational training 0.008 −0.021
(0.068) (0.059)
[1,926] [1,926]
Higher education −0.045 −0.042
(0.065) (0.057)
[1,926] [1,926]
Degree of unemployment −668.8 −1153
(2031) (2024)
[1,926] [1,926]
Sick days −755.0 −795.6
(1308) (1285)
[1,926] [1,926]
No. of visits to doctor 1.025 1.480
(2.040) (2.011)
[1,926] [1,926]
Diagnosed with diseases in bones, muscles and connective 0.030 0.033
tissue (0.048) (0.048)
[1,926] [1,926]
Inference: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
Governmental sector compared to municipal/regional sector. Difference-in-differences analyses. OLS estimates. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in brackets.
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Nor is there a significant difference in terms of firm size. One may expect that
larger firms face lower costs of assessing applicants and would therefore have less of
an incentive to intensify their search efforts to identify specific employees and, thus,
a greater tendency to hire employees internally. On the other hand, large firms also
face higher monitoring costs, which should lead them to intensify their search efforts
and search more widely (see, e.g., Welters and Muysken 2006). However, the results
are the same when splitting by firm size, meaning that economies of scale in assess-
ments and monitoring effects roughly balance out. The strongest result appears for
the low-educated (less than vocational level) in each case, suggesting that the com-
position of Flexjob employees from this group shifts more towards internal hiring
Table 7 Heterogeneity in the reform effect on Flexjob recruitment from non-employment
among subpopulations
Flexjob recruitment from non-employment
Without covariates With covariates









Aged < 45 −0.301*** −0.268***
(0.107) (0.099)
[664] [664]
Aged > 44 −0.335*** −0.335***
(0.070) (0.069)
[1,258] [1,258]
Low educated −0.540*** −0.534***
(0.104) (0.098)
[728] [728]
Highly educated −0.189*** −0.201***
(0.069) (0.069)
[1,194] [1,194]
Workplace with < 50 employees −0.212 −0.204
(0.160) (0.157)
[535] [535]
Workplace with > 49 employees −0.250*** −0.253***
(0.070) (0.076)
[1,093] [1,093]
Inference: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
LPM estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in brackets.
Difference-in-differences analyses.
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sult matches earlier findings in the literature that suggest that firms intensify their
assessment efforts to find productive workers, in particular when the job task to be
performed is complex (Welters and Muysken 2006, Barron et al. 1997, Barron et al.
1987). That is, for the group of highly educated workers, the rise in internal hiring is
lower because firms still have a financial incentive to search more widely to find pro-
ductive workers.
8 Discussion
Could one interpretation of our findings be that when the subsidy is lowered, the
greater internal hiring that results is a case of deadweight loss, i.e., hiring of em-
ployees who would have been retained otherwise? This could be particularly relevant
Table 8 Heterogeneity in the reform effect on retained Flexjob employees among
subpopulations
Retained Flexjob employees
Without covariates With covariates









Aged < 45 0.419*** 0.405***
(0.115) (0.114)
[666] [666]
Aged > 44 0.375*** 0.381***
(0.081) (0.079)
[1,260] [1,260]
Low educated 0.539*** 0.534***
(0.114) (0.112)
[729] [729]
Highly educated 0.295*** 0.313***
(0.083) (0.083)
[1,197] [1,197]
Workplace with < 50 employees 0.223 0.261
(0.173) (0.163)
[536] [536]
Workplace with > 49 employees 0.257*** 0.264***
(0.077) (0.075)
[1,096] [1,096]
Inference: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
LPM estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations in brackets.
Difference-in-differences analyses
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so that eligibility can be more easily manipulated. According to the National Labor
Market Authority (2010), half of those directly referred to a Flexjob (i.e., without a
period of wait unemployment in between) continue in a Flexjob at their previous
workplace. Further, Holt et al. (2003) find that about half of the 2,495 surveyed firms
in the private sector reported that one or more of their employees who were working
in subsidized jobs would have been employed even without the subsidy. These con-
cerns suggest some deadweight loss resulting from Flexjobs being assigned to indi-
viduals who would have been employed anyway. It seems reasonable to assume that
retained workers – at least to some extent – perform the same tasks as before they
were granted a Flexjob, but now with a subsidy. However, deadweight loss ought to
decrease and not increase when the subsidy is lowered. Furthermore, some retained
Datta Gupta et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:10 Page 23 of 26workers might have never been retained absent the program, and some new hires
might have occurred absent the program. If the ratio of the two increases following a
decrease in the subsidy rate, this most likely indicates, as mentioned earlier, that em-
ployers just want to save on search costs and give priority to workers already
employed by renewing their contracts.
An important caveat is that government institutions are fully subsidized before the
reform, which is an unlikely scenario compared to the general design of employment
subsidies. We must assume then that firm behavior is linear in the ratio of subsidized
wages. Alternatively, our finding may be interpreted as saying that anything less than a
full subsidy will result in more internal hiring. This can only be confirmed by analyzing
future reforms that lower subsidy levels even further. To return to the question we
started with, it does appear that, conversely, increasing wage subsidies for the disabled
may increase employment, reduce internal hiring and increase hiring out of non-
employment and thus reduce the welfare losses of non-employment, but this may re-
quire full subsidization of wages of disabled workers.
9 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the welfare loss effect of a change in the reimbursement structure of
a major nation-wide wage subsidy scheme for the disabled in Denmark that applied only
to governmental units. We investigate empirically whether the changes in the reimburse-
ment amount affected the number and the share of all new Flexjob hires that are, respect-
ively, hired out of non-employment vs. the number and share that are retained employees
in governmental units compared to municipal/regional units. Descriptive evidence sug-
gests that after the reform lowering the subsidy rate, governmental units were much less
inclined to take in new hires as theory would suggest. Based on descriptive evidence and
our empirical analysis, we find a substantial substitution between “insiders” and “outsiders”
in both absolute and relative terms, showing that the reimbursement reform in 2002 aimed
only at governmental institutions for the purpose of reducing their incentives to hire Flexjob
workers changed such firms’ preferences between hiring new Flexjob employees from non-
employment and retaining existing employees.
After the reform, governmental units created fewer Flexjobs, while the comparison
group increased this number. This suggests that after the reform, the treatment group
created fewer Flexjobs than they would have done in absence of the reduction in the re-
imbursement amount. At the same time, the composition of Flexjob hires within such
firms changed substantially such that the share of new Flexjobs allocated to non-
employed (retained) employees is three-quarters (twice) as large after the reform than
it would have been in absence of the reform. At the same time, the absolute number of
the non-employed (retained) decreased (increased). This compositional change favoring
insiders arises even though firms in the Danish welfare state are presumably more com-
mitted to hiring non-employed workers, so we may expect an even larger impact in
economies with less active welfare states.
A mechanism explaining our finding could be that when subsidies are reduced and
worker productivity not known with certainty (as is the case for disabled workers), in-
creased internal hiring is likely to result as firms now have an economic incentive to
try to hire productive workers to fill these positions. In the absence of a way to deter-
mine productivity of disabled workers, firms resort to more internal hiring. The fact
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roborates this ‘assessment costs’ interpretation of the findings, as the higher the com-
plexity of the job task performed, the greater is the economic incentive to intensify
assessment efforts and search more widely. Furthermore, because of their credentials,
the productivity of highly educated workers is arguably less likely to be unknown to
firms. Thus, in the absence of full wage subsidization, in order to be able to reduce the
welfare losses of non-employment and decrease internal hiring of disabled workers for
wage subsidized positions – in particular those with low education – there must be a
way for firms to screen new hires for such positions coming from unemployment or
out of the labor market without incurring costs. Public job search assistance programs
could aid employers by incorporating job auditions or job tryouts and by providing cer-
tification of job readiness in the case of disabled job seekers, particularly those with low
education.
Our paper raises the important issue of how employment policies can change
the composition of who is hired, e.g., insiders versus outsiders, an issue that has
not been addressed much in existing literature. This substitution to insiders from
outsiders following a decrease in the subsidy rate would appear to dampen welfare-loss
reduction. We were not able to make causal statements on the effect of the
subsidy change on total employment creation, although inspection of the data
pointed to a decline in external hiring in absolute levels as well. A full assessment
of the policy’s effects would require modeling the effects on total employment in
addition.
Endnotes
1A meta-analysis of microeconometric evaluations of active labor market policies
showed that subsidized public sector employment programs are less likely to yield posi-
tive impacts compared to job search assistance, classroom and on-the-job training
(Card et al. 2010).
2A similar program was the New Deal for the Disabled (Britain), a voluntary program
for the disabled that offered job-seeking assistance services through a national
organization of Job Brokers. The take-up rate, however, was low, covering only 1.9%
of the eligible population (Pires et al. 2006). Since 2009, the New Deal was replaced by
the Flexible New Deal and from 2011 by The Work Programme.
3In cases where participation in other labor market programs is not relevant, the
latter criterion can be waived.
4In 2011, the employer was, on average, entitled to a wage subsidy of DKK 184,500
($32,000) per man-year (Ministry of Finance, 2012).
5For Flexjobs granted from July 1st, 2006 and on, the minimum negotiated wage
as stipulated in the relevant collective agreement constitutes a cap for the wage used
for calculating the partial wage subsidy. In 2010, the cap was DKK 445,000 ($79,400)
(National Labor Market Authority 2010).
6This was true for the observation period in this study. From January 1st, 2013, a
number of changes of the scheme were implemented. For example, Flexjobs are granted
for a 5-year period, after which the case is re-examined before it can be extended for
another 5-year period. Further, the incentives for firms to employ disabled workers with
a working capacity of less than 1/3 are increased.
Datta Gupta et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:10 Page 25 of 267“Wait unemployment” means unemployment among individuals found eligible for a
Flexjob.
8Findings in the report by DISCUS (2005) show that the use of the 1/3 subsidy was
negligible; only 1.4% of all Flexjob employees were entitled to the 1/3 subsidy in 2003.
Since only few Flexjob-grantees actually leave the scheme, we assume that the share of
all Flexjob-grantees entitled to the 1/3 subsidy were also negligible in the pre-reform
period analyzed here (1999 to 2001). Therefore, it seems reasonable to believe that the
abandonment of the 1/3 subsidy does not affect the number and composition of Flex-
job hires significantly.
9See, for instance, Eriksson and Lagerström (2006) for empirical evidence that firms
prefer contacting and hiring employed candidates compared to observationally equiva-
lent unemployed candidates.
10Here, we also include individuals who were working in the same firm in year t-1
but were hired in a Flexjob in year t (i.e., a retained employee).
11Results are qualitatively similar when we include information for 2002, although
the sample size is larger (available on request), and the treatment effect is, as expected,
smaller, since any effect on hiring occurs only after the hiring freeze is lifted, i.e., after
2002.
12We do not analyze these data within a difference-in-difference framework because
the pre-reform trends are not parallel. Ignoring the parallel-trend assumption and esti-
mating the DD anyway produces the same result – a 0.05 percentage point reduction
in new Flexjob hires compared to all new hires in governmental units post-reform com-
pared to comparison firms, both with and without controls, LPM or Probit (available
on request).
13In Additional file 1: Table S1 and Table S2, we show the results for the full set of
covariates.
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